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ABSTRACT
I analyze the parallel constructions of the institution of the United States Forest Service and the idea 
of fire as a public enemy in the first half of the twentieth century. From where did this fire-as-enemy 
construction emerge, and what purpose did it serve? I draw extensively from Yale collections for my re-
search, including glass slides of early-1900s forest fire prevention posters, a pamphlet of eerie chil-
dren’s songs from 1928 with violent language about punishing those who start forest fires, and a Yale 
School of Forestry student’s 1934 thesis. I argue that equating forest fire with a public enemy has logi-
cal roots in the connections between fighting fire and fighting war, especially following the 1910 Great 
Fires. This construction both came from and bolstered the United States Forest Service (USFS) as 
it transformed from a fledgling government agency to a department marshaling the resources of a siz-
able army. The power of propaganda entrenched this construction in the public conscience by connect-
ing forest fires and waste of natural resources, a particularly impactful link during the economic crisis 
of the 1930s. The fire-as-enemy construction justified a policy of total fire suppression by equating fire 
suppression with waste prevention, casting the ultimate enemy not as fire, but as the waste of resources. 
The War on  Fire: Construction of Enemies and 
the U.S. Forest Service
By Isabel Kirsch1
1Department of History, Yale University
Yes, we’ll have a jolly time
On mountain, lake and plain;
In the U.S. Forest we will every rule maintain… 
(Oregon State Forester)
At first glance, this 1928 children’s song, sung to the upbeat tune 
“Marching Through Georgia,” seems to be a happy paean to re-
sponsible enjoyment of American national forests. The song is one 
of twenty-two in a collection titled “Forest Songs and Playlets for 
Use in Schools and by Boys’ and Girls’ Clubs,” arranged by the 
United States Forest Service and published by the State Forester of 
Oregon (Oregon State Forester). The lyrics to this tune, “Camping 
Song,” were written by S. Leila Hoover, a fire lookout in Oregon’s 
Deschutes Forest (Oregon State Forester). Given Hoover’s role as 
a United States Forest Service employee, her focus on following 
rules in the national forests is understandable. Even with her job in 
mind, however, the remainder of the verse is chilling:
     
… Execute the fiend of fire
In Uncle Sam’s domain
While in the Forest we’re camping. 
(Oregon State Forester)
It is unsettling to imagine the booklet’s target audience, school-
aged children, cheerily singing about “[execution],” even though 
the target of their efforts is the non-human “fiend of fire.” By call-
ing for the execution of the personified “fiend of fire,” Hoover pres-
ents wildfire as an enemy, and a national enemy at that. National 
forests, like the Deschutes Forest where she worked, were “Uncle 
Sam’s domain;” to Hoover, a fire in a national forest was an attack 
on the entire country.
While the stark description of forest fire as an enemy has logical 
roots in American frontier ideology and the connections between 
fighting a fire and fighting a war, the development of these simi-
larities into a cultural phenomenon and the endurance of this con-
nection is hazier. Ultimately, this construction’s staying power both 
came from and bolstered the fledgling U.S. Forest Service’s poli-
cy of total fire suppression. Despite emerging scientific evidence 
opposing a total suppression policy, the power of propaganda and 
cultural reinforcement of views of fire as a solely destructive force 
fueled each other. While a policy of total suppression had devastat-
ing consequences for national forests, the U.S. Forest Service used 
this policy to gain legitimacy, both within and outside the federal 
government, especially following the agency-defining Great Fires 
of 1910.
Roderick Nash’s seminal 1967 environmental history text, Wilder-
ness and the American Mind, clarifies our definition of an enemy 
in the context of this paper. Nash’s work traced the concept of wil-
derness in the American imagination, ranging from Western Euro-
pean, Christian symbolism to the period of westward expansion to 
the emergence of the conservation movement. To the pioneers who 
ventured west in the 1800s, the supposedly untrammeled frontier 
posed both a physical and spiritual threat (Nash 24).  The pioneers’ 
survival depended on exerting enough control over their unfamiliar 
settings to secure food and shelter. Additionally, centuries of Puri-
tan teachings about the “moral vacuum” of wild spaces, a sentiment 
that furthered attacks on and disdain for existing native popula-
tions, offered moral support for the push for taming these unknown 
lands (Nash 24).
As the pioneers ventured west, they increasingly framed their 
struggles in militaristic terms. Journal entries and historians alike 
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have described the need to “conquer” and “subdue” wilderness; 
Nash highlighted in particular a Michigan pioneer who described 
his “struggle….[to convert] wilderness into a rich and prosperous 
civilization” (27).  By the early twentieth century, the period on 
which this paper focuses, the primal fear of forested, wild land had 
diminished. Nash attributed this changing mindset to industrial 
growth and Americans’ newfound distance from wild places (24).
Forests and wild spaces did not pose the same existential threat to 
early twentieth century city dwellers that they did to earlier pio-
neers. However, this construction of a naturally-existing enemy that 
must be defeated with military strength for both physical and moral 
survival persisted in the case of forest fires. Just like the earlier for-
ests of Puritan New England, forest fires were frightening in their 
refusal to bend easily to human control. A 
raging fire on federal lands was particular-
ly threatening, showing the might of nature 
over human boundaries and structures of 
government. The enemy that Hoover de-
scribed in her eerie children’s song, then, 
embodied the lasting influence of Puritan 
morals and the challenges of frontier life. 
This enemy threatened the physical and 
moral well-being of American people, as 
well as the control and power of the federal 
government over its claimed land.
Hoover was not alone in depicting forest 
fires as an enemy figure; in fact, academ-
ic literature from this time period utilized 
the same description. In Yale School of Forestry student Edwin 
L. Giddings’ 1934 thesis, “The Forest Fire Problem in the Pacific 
Northwest,” he referred to past fires as “one of the forests’ great-
est enemies” (i). This reference, prominently located in the second 
paragraph of his introduction, reveals the reach of the construction 
of forest fire as an enemy presence beyond Western forester circles 
and into the academic realm. Here, we see the fire-specific case of 
Nash’s analysis of wilderness as an enemy. Giddings framed fire 
not as an enemy of the people, or of the nation, but rather of “the 
forests” (i). Just as wilderness posed an existential threat to early 
Americans on the frontier, uncontrolled fires posed an existential 
threat to the managed forests that this wilderness had become. This 
construction raises compelling questions about the state of Ameri-
can fire management during the first half of the twentieth century. 
What gave it its cultural sticking power? How did the American un-
derstanding of forests shift from the fear of untamed wildlands to a 
desire to protect those same environments from the ravages of fire?
Not only did the description of forest fire as an enemy bear emo-
tional weight from the frontier period, but it also had logical roots 
in the connections between fighting fire and fighting war. This con-
struction both came from and bolstered the United States Forest 
Service (USFS) as it transformed from a fledgling government 
agency to a department marshaling the resources of a sizable army, 
especially following the Great Fires of 1910. 
The United States Forest Service (USFS) was originally a margin-
ally relevant federal bureau that gained authority, land, and funding 
only after fierce advocacy by its first Chief Forester, Gifford Pin-
chot. The March 1891 Forest Reserve Act, signed by President Ben-
jamin Harrison, first authorized the president to set aside public for-
est reserves (Williams 39). By the following year, the president had 
signed fifteen forest reserves encompassing thirteen million acres 
into existence (Omi 87). These reserves and the thirteen reserves 
established by President Grover Cleveland in February 1897, just 
ten days before he left office, fell under the purview of the General 
Land Office (GLO) within the Department of the Interior (Egan 
34). The GLO’s main task was not the management of public lands, 
but rather the transfer of public lands to private ownership (Egan 
39). GLO employees spent much of their time investigating fraud-
ulent land claims under the Homestead Act and doling out parcels 
of land for western settlement.
It wasn’t until Theodore Roosevelt’s pres-
idency that the federal government began 
active management of the forest reserves, 
thanks in large part to the urging of Gif-
ford Pinchot. Pinchot, who came from a 
wealthy Pennsylvania family and studied 
forestry in Europe, brought modern for-
est management to the United States and 
would later start the Yale School of Forest-
ry. He led the Bureau of Forestry housed in 
the Department of Agriculture and argued 
vociferously that this bureau should over-
see the forest reserves. Under the current 
system, he argued, the Bureau of Forestry 
had no forests to manage, while the GLO 
prioritized issues with private land and 
neglected its forest reserve management obligations. His lobbying 
and close personal relationship with the president proved success-
ful: on February 1, 1905, the Transfer Act shifted the forest reserves 
to the purview of the USDA’s Bureau of Forestry and appropriated 
a small budget for training forest rangers (Williams 39). Later that 
summer, the bureau was renamed the United States Forest Service, 
with Gifford Pinchot as its first Chief Forester (Egan 49). Pinchot 
had a devoted following of young foresters and support within the 
USFS; however, he was ousted in March 1910 by President Taft 
after a dispute with Taft’s chosen Secretary of the Interior, Richard 
Ballinger, over leasing coal lands in Alaska (Williams 78).
That parched August, as winds picked up and reached gale force 
across the mountain West, isolated smaller fires ignited into the 
so-called “Big Blowup” (Spencer 18), While forest fires, usually 
sparked by lightning or an errant spark from a passing train, were 
common, the scale and the devastating speed with which the flames 
raced across Idaho and western Montana were unprecedented. The 
“Big Blowup,” also known as “The Great Fires” and “The Big 
Burn,” and the resultant eighty-seven casualties, the majority of 
whom were firefighters, were both deeply humiliating and galva-
nizing for the fledgling USFS (Pinchot 59).
A statement from Gifford Pinchot as the flames died down summa-
rized the agency’s response: “The Forest Service has done wonders 
with its handful of devoted men… This year… there were too many 
fires and too few rangers… If even a small fraction of the loss from 
the present fires had been expended in additional patrol and preven-
tative equipment, some or perhaps nearly all of the loss could have 
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been avoided” (Pinchot 58-9). Pinchot was no longer USFS Chief 
when he made this statement; however, USFS leadership agreed 
with and continued his response strategy. Instead of potentially 
facing blame for inadequate forest management, the USFS framed 
the fires’ devastation as resulting from a lack of federal financial 
support and buckled down on a policy of total fire suppression. 
By 1913, Pinchot’s successor and friend from Yale, Chief Forest-
er Henry Graves, declared that “the necessity of preventing losses 
from forest fires requires no discussion. It is the fundamental obli-
gation of the Forest Service…” (Pyne, Fire in America 261). The 
post-1910 USFS approach was, in the words of former wildland 
firefighter Timothy Ingalsbee, a “war on wildfire” (262). Like the 
mythical phoenix, then, the USFS’ policy of total fire suppression 
rose from the ashes of the 1910 fires. 
Beyond influencing the USFS’ militaristic approach to fire manage-
ment for the better part of the twentieth century, the 1910 fires also 
formalized a partnership between the USFS and the United States 
Army. On August 8, 1910, President William Howard Taft autho-
rized troops to fight fires in national forests and sent thirty-three 
companies to assist the USFS with firefighting efforts. The Seattle 
Daily Times reported favorably on these new arrivals in an August 
10, 1910 article titled “Soldiers do Great Fire Fighting Work”: 
“Soldiers of Uncle Sam fought all last night to save one of the play-
grounds of the nation [Yellowstone National Park] from devasta-
tion by fire” (Spencer 65).
Just as the Army sent troops to aid firefighting efforts, so too did 
foresters aid the war effort during World War I. In 1917, shortly 
after the United States’ entry into the “Great War,” came the cre-
ation of the 10th and 20th Engineer (Forestry) Regiments (Williams 
81). The regiments, later merged into one unit, consisted of trained 
foresters and loggers. Once deployed to France, their jobs included 
locating and cutting timber and operating sawmills, mainly to build 
railroad ties and Allied trenches (Williams 86).
While foresters served abroad, the Army took steps to protect timber 
supply at home by creating the Spruce Production Division (SPD). 
In addition to protecting private sawmills from potential sabotage 
by striking workers, the men in this unit cut Sitka spruce for air-
planes and Douglas fir for ships (Williams 87). By early 1919, more 
than 30,000 SPD men had been sent to the Pacific Northwest, fur-
ther entrenching the connection between the military and national 
forest lands (Williams 87).
Beyond using the same men to fight both fire and war, the develop-
ment of fire suppression infrastructure had direct, lasting military 
connections. In 1918, just after the “Great War,” the U.S. Forest 
Service contracted with the Army Air Service for planes and pi-
lots. This partnership allowed for aerial patrol of forests in which 
an Army pilot would fly while a Forest Service spotter looked for 
fires below. The first of these pilot programs was established in 
California in 1919, and similar programs soon began in Oregon, 
Washington, Idaho, and Montana (Williams 111). Military technol-
ogy is still used in firefighting efforts today. In fact, the U.S. Forest 
Service used World War II warplanes outfitted to drop fire retardant 
until the early 2000s (Omi 211). These many connections between 
the military and national forests, from the explicit use of soldiers in 
firefighting and foresters in war to the U.S. Forest Service’s acqui-
sition of military planes, provide logical background for the emer-
gence of the construction of fire as an enemy combatant in addition 
to Nash’s frontier mentality explanation.
If forest fire was an enemy, then the Great Depression, ironically a 
boon to the USFS, provided the agency with its army, the Civilian 
Conservation Corps (CCC). The CCC was one of the many New 
Deal-era programs that provided work for unemployed young men 
during the Great Depression; its first camp opened in Virginia in 
April 1933 (Maher). The majority of CCC camps fell under the 
purview of the USFS. For the first time, forest rangers commanded 
set fire crews, much like a general in battle, instead of recruiting 
individual firefighters as needed (Pyne, Fire in America 361). In 
addition to a new, readily available supply of firefighting labor, the 
CCC also provided necessary manpower to construct fire suppres-
sion infrastructure. While these projects ostensibly existed to pro-
vide jobs, they further legitimized the war against fire by construct-
ing a war-like infrastructure system for fire control. In 1936 alone, 
CCC workers “stretched 44,750 miles of telephone line, cleared 
11,402 miles of truck trails, maintained an additional 62,920 miles 
of trail, [and] constructed 611 lookout towers” in national forests, 
according to Stephen J. Pyne (Fire in America 365). Two decades 
later, economic crisis finally gave the USFS the resources that Pin-
chot had requested following the devastation of the 1910 fires: “If 
a forest is equipped with roads, trails, telephone lines and a reason-
able number of men for patrol, there is no more likelihood that great 
fires will be able to get started than there is that great conflagrations 
like the Chicago fire will get started in a city with a modern fire 
department” (Pinchot 58).
In 1935, in the midst of CCC construction, Chief Forester Ferdinand 
Augustus “Gus” Silcox instituted the now-infamous 10:00am poli-
cy, under which the agency vowed to suppress all fires by 10:00am 
on the day after their discovery (Omi 85). While fire suppression 
was the agency’s informally accepted policy since the devastation 
of the 1910 fires, the official acceptance of the 10:00am policy 
marked a new era for the USFS in its increasingly militarized fight 
against fire. The USFS and its CCC laborers were not concerned 
with urban fires affecting major population centers, but rather fires 
in some of the nation’s least accessible, most sparsely-populated ar-
eas. If not for the sake of protecting homes and human lives, what, 
then, made the national forests worth protecting from fire?
The answer lies in the forests themselves, specifically in the wealth 
of timber that they harbored. Historian Betty Spencer alluded to this 
bounty in her description of the 1910 blowup: “It destroyed tract 
after tract of white and yellow pine, spruce, Douglas and white fir, 
tamarack, and hemlock comprising the most valuable timber in our 
country” (Spencer 17-8). Government propaganda reveals both the 
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construction of forest fire as an enemy and this emphasis on timber 
preservation. “The Forest Fire,” another tune in the children’s song-
book, described Hoover’s “forest fiend” as “burning up our forest 
wealth,/and our pleasure and our health,/bringing sorrow and de-
spair to every child” (Oregon State Forester). A series of USFS for-
est fire prevention posters from 1900-1945 similarly framed fire as 
an enemy specifically because of its destruction of timber. “Don’t 
be responsible for this,” reads a banner over the slumped body of 
an ax-wielding man labeled “PROSPERITY” as a fire rages in the 
background. “Be careful with fire in the woods.” In another poster, a 
woman, also labeled “PROSPERITY” screams as flames approach. 
She stands tied to a wooden stake, eerily reminiscent of classical 
descriptions of Joan of Arc being burned at the stake. While this 
poster is undated, its text suggests that it was produced in the late 
1910s: “Forest fires cost the Pacific coast $6,000,000.00 in 1918. 
You share this loss” (Forest Fire Poster Collection). Another evoc-
ative poster shows a target hung on a thick tree trunk surrounded 
by dense forest. “Forests are community wealth,” reads the target. 
“You hit it. Put fire out,” explains the rest of the poster (Forest Fire 
Poster Collection).
These examples are by no means the only references to forest 
wealth in the two primary source collections, but they display the 
USFS’ focus on fire prevention for economic reasons. It is notable 
that this propaganda did not seek to prevent fires for the sake of 
forest preservation, but rather for profit. While the children’s songs 
recognized forests’ natural beauty, even they framed fire as an eco-
nomic loss because it burnt down trees that could otherwise be har-
vested, their stored energy harnessed for human use. According to 
these government publications, preventing forest fire was a national 
priority because of the waste of natural resources that it implied.
Fire as a naturally occurring phenomenon can be traced back at 
least 400 million years, and its basic building blocks, the so-called 
“Fire Triangle” of oxygen, fuel, and heat, have not changed since 
then (Pyne, America’s Fires 1; Omi 115). Stephen J. Pyne describes 
fire as a “violent form of decomposition” because of the stored 
chemical energy that it releases (Fire in America 20). He argues 
that controlling fire for human purposes, like hunting, cooking, and 
communicating, catalyzed construction of human society and our 
species’ spread and dominance (Pyne, Fire in America 4). The re-
lationship between fire and war, then, originates well before Pres-
ident Taft’s authorization of Army troops to fight the 1910 Great 
Fires. In Pyne’s view, fire is humankind’s first strategic weapon, 
used to terrorize enemies and destroy villages, agriculture, and a 
familiar local environment (Fire in America 390). More broadly, 
control of fire is control of energy. Fire is such an enduring tool 
of war because it releases the stored energy of whatever lies in its 
path. When this power is harnessed as a weapon, fire has the capac-
ity to destroy food sources and building materials, in addition to the 
more obvious possibility for loss of human life.
During World War II, termed a “fire war” by Pyne, fire was weap-
onized to a degree never before seen (Fire in America 394). Instead 
of the flaming arrows or torched villages associated with early war-
time uses of fire, fire weapons in the 1940s included flame throw-
ers, napalm, and, of course, the atomic bomb (Pyne, Fire in Ameri-
ca 394). Beginning in November 1944, the Japanese army launched 
almost 9,000 self-propelled paper balloons, each thirty-three feet 
across and carrying three bombs, across the Pacific Ocean. The jet 
stream carried these balloons across North America, from Mexico 
to Canada, California to Michigan. As a military operation, the bal-
loons were unsuccessful: only six American civilians were killed, 
and there were only 285 recorded balloon landings. However, mass 
casualty was not the goal of these balloons. Instead, the Japanese 
army’s goals in launching the fire balloons included diverting re-
sources for the war effort, demoralizing civilians, and encouraging 
outright destruction (Pyne, Fire in America 395). The attacks were 
successful in diverting American wartime resources, as they result-
ed in Project Firefly, a collaboration between the USFS and the 
military to prevent fires caused by the Japanese balloons. The Army 
supplied airplanes, 2,700 troops for fire suppression, and a promise 
of fire control assistance from nearby military bases (Pyne, Fire in 
America 396).
The attacks’ final goal, outright destruction, is most relevant to our 
discussion of fire suppression. Destruction purely for destruction’s 
sake is the epitome of waste; both the Japanese army and the USFS 
recognized that destroying a resource means that nobody can use 
it. For the Japanese army, burning American forests would result 
in less available timber for the American war effort, and therefore 
a weaker opponent. For the USFS, the burning of American timber 
made that timber unavailable for sustainable forest management, 
and therefore unavailable as a source of profit. 
In 1909, Gifford Pinchot wrote that conservation “holds that it is 
about as important to see that the people in general get the benefit 
of our natural resources as to see that there shall be natural resourc-
es left” (Pinchot 55). To Pinchot and the generations of foresters 
whom he influenced, natural resources like timber served a purpose 
— American prosperity. Government publications like children’s 
songs and posters demonstrate the expansive reach of this guiding 
belief. During the Great Depression, when waste was anathema, 
the CCC created the infrastructure that made total suppression, and 
hence total waste prevention, feasible. The political climate of eco-
nomic crisis and the promise of CCC labor made Chief Forester 
Gus Silcox willing to consider, and eventually implement, the no-
torious 10:00am suppression policy (Pyne, Fire in America 282). 
The CCC was disbanded in 1942, but the notion of fire suppression 
as waste prevention lived on during World War II, both for Jap-
anese strategists and for American foresters. While later advanc-
es in fire science disproved total fire suppression as ecologically 
unsound and responsible for the fuel buildup causing intense fires 
today, in the first half of the twentieth century, the fire-as-enemy 
construction justified total suppression, which was equated with 
waste prevention (Hudson 3). In the period that began with worry 
about Gilded Age industrialists destroying natural resources and 
concluded with economic crisis ended only by American entry into 
Pyne’s so-called “fire war,” waste prevention had widespread cul-
tural appeal and many adherents, including within the USFS. While 
constructing fire as a national enemy bolstered the USFS’ authority, 
especially in areas of the country like the rural Pacific Northwest 
with a history of hostility toward the federal government, fire itself 
was not the enemy; rather, the waste of timber and forest resources 
that fire represented was the actual enemy that the USFS sought to 
defeat.
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